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             Cognitive control mechanisms were examined through depletion and restoration 
manipulations common in self-regulation literature. In this within-subjects, double-blind 
placebo-controlled experiment, 33 participants performed three blocks of a high-
congruency version of the flanker task while their EEG signals were recorded. Cognitive 
fatigue was induced in participants by lengthy flanker blocks, and they received either 
glucose or a placebo, so we could examine the effects of metabolic restoration. Overall, 
there was a main effect of cognitive fatigue on flanker accuracy and on error-related 
event related potentials (ERPs). Participants had more accurate responses in the third 
block of the flanker task when they drank glucose as compared to the placebo. 
Additionally, the error-related negativity (ERN) waveform increased in amplitude during 
the third block of the flanker task when participants drank glucose. These findings 
suggest that there is overlap between the bodies of literature on cognitive control and 
self-regulation, specifically when measuring the activity in the anterior cingulate cortex 
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Directed attention has long been recognized to have a limited capacity, which 
draw on limited metabolic resources (Hockey, 1977; Wickens, 1991). Researchers have 
provided converging evidence that when cognitive demand increases, blood glucose 
levels decrease (Scholey, Harper, & Kennedy, 2001). Furthermore, when participants 
engage in higher-order cognitive functions for an extended period of time, they tend to 
feel fatigued. This effect is seen across many cognitive and social domains. The present 
experiment identifies the specific neural substrates involved in cognitive control and 
addresses which neural substrates are sensitive to resource availability and cognitive 
fatigue.  
Cognitive control is a broad term used for the cognitive functions performed to 
monitor performance and to manipulate goal-directed cognitive information. Cognitive 
control allows humans to flexibly process information, to perform multiple tasks 
simultaneously, and to override prepotent responses. Braver (2012) provides a framework 
for two mechanisms of cognitive control; proactive and reactive control are subsets 
within a larger cognitive control mechanism. Proactive control is required for planning 
for future events, whereas reactive control is used for correcting errant behavior. 
Proactive control is generally more effective, but also demands more energy. Reactive 
control, though, is more susceptible to interference effects, but is also less demanding 





cortex (PFC) supports goal maintenance, enabling on-task behavior, whereas the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) plays a critical role in providing negative feedback to errors and 
strategically adjusting off-task behavior when necessary (Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007; 
Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; Cohen, Botvinick, & Carter, 2000).  The present study 
utilizes ERPs signatures in combination with the experimental manipulations of cognitive 
fatigue and resource availability (i.e., glucose vs. placebo) to better understand the role of 
glucose in modulating cognitive behavior. 
One way of demonstrating how the brain processes information is as though there 
are two systems at work. Daniel Kahneman calls these two systems “system one” and 
“system two” (Kahneman, 2011). System one is incredibly quick, and acts as a primary 
attention filter to select for the relevant stimuli in the environment to attend to. This 
system needs to be quick, since there are copious amounts of information in the 
environment, most of which are irrelevant to the task at hand. System one requires no 
conscious thought and operates automatically, without the need for effort or metabolic 
resources. This is made possible by long-term memories – the library of experiences we 
have built up over our lifetime. System two, on the other hand, represents the system 
responsible for conscious thought, problem solving, and creative and critical thinking. 
System two requires effort (ergo, resources) and is slow and deliberate. Another 
difference between system one and system two is that system two exists within working 
memory, so system two is limited by individual differences in working memory capacity. 
The limits of working memory capacity are demonstrated by the classic seven plus-or-
minus two experiment (Miller, 1956). 





one, developed through the painstaking deliberate practice of system two. Most of our 
day-to-day life is a stroll for system two with most tasks handled automatically by system 
one. Just as we spend a lot of our lives lounging around, our brains spend most of their 
time doing the mental equivalent. For repetitive tasks we have developed automatic ways 
of doing things, reserving system two’s limited capacity for things that really need our 
attention. Just as it's hard to motivate someone to get off the couch and exercise, it's hard 
to get system two to give its full effort. There's an appeal to doing things you already 
know, for a musician to play the same familiar songs that system one has already 
automated, that feel and sound good. To always drive with the GPS on so you never get 
lost, but you also never learn the way. Because thinking takes effort, it involves fighting 
through confusion, and for most of us that's at least somewhat unpleasant because of the 
level of effort involved. 
It is assumed that glucose is the primary metabolic resource utilized by higher 
order cognitive functions (Persson, Welsh, Jonides, & Reuter-Lorenz, 2007). Researchers 
have also proposed that the primary resources that are used by the brain are glucose and 
glycogen (Gailliot et al., 2007; Kennedy & Scholey, 2000; Scholey, Harper, & Kennedy, 
2001). Similar findings have been found regarding resource models of self-regulation. 
Self-regulation is a controlled process, which requires resources. In one experiment, 
Baumeister and his colleagues demonstrated that participants who ate radishes and were 
tempted with chocolate chip cookies before attempting to complete a series of impossible 
tasks quickly realized that the problems they were being presented with were unsolvable 
(Baumeister Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). In the other condition, participants 





longer amount of time. The self-regulatory behavior in resisting the tempting food, in the 
form of chocolate chip cookies, took a cognitive toll on the participants who had to 
engage in self-regulation, affecting their decision-making skills and their higher-order 
cognitive functions. 
According to Baumeister and other social psychology researchers (Bandura, 1991; 
Carver & Scheier, 1981), self-regulation is an inhibition control process in which 
individuals attempt to reign in unwanted behaviors and ignore distracting cues to keep the 
cues from impeding a particular social-based goal. In Baumeister’s model, self-regulation 
is akin to a muscle that tires due to several factors, one of which is ego depletion 
(Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007). Researchers define ego depletion as the state of 
depletion following the use of self-control or willpower. Baumeister and colleagues argue 
that the self-regulation “muscle” can also be strengthened through training and cognitive-
behavioral instruction. Baumeister suggests that when we become “depleted” of our self-
regulatory resources, we tend to make more errors and fail to regulate behavior properly. 
Baumeister and colleagues (1998) also concluded that multiple cognitive and social 
functions such as choice, self-regulation, active response, and volition all share common 
resources. Moreover, consuming glucose can replenish participants’ abilities to engage in 
self-regulatory behaviors and can increase the amount of cognitive control employed in 
oppositional logic tasks (Gailliot et al., 2007; Scholey, Harper, & Kennedy, 2001). 
Cognitive control and self-regulation, being higher order cognitive functions, both utilize 
similar neural substrates and resources.  
Individuals depleted of glucose (including those on low-carbohydrate diets or 





decreased working memory efficiency, and experience a lower mood than those who are 
not on a diet (D’Anci, Watts, Kanarek, & Taylor, 2009). Studies have also found that 
self-regulation resources are replenished in depleted participants after they consume 
glucose (Gailliot et al., 2007). Thus, glucose metabolism is critical for engaging in 
higher-order cognitive processes such as self-regulation and attentional control 
effectively. Depletion of self-regulatory resources occurs when individuals are either 
lacking resources in the form of glucose or when competing processes deplete the shared 
resource. Making difficult choices (Vohs et al., 2009), negative affect (Heatherton & 
Wagner, 2011), mental fatigue (van der Linden, Frese, & Meijman, 2003), ego depletion 
(Baumeister, 2002; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010; Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 
2012), excessive stress (Cohen & Spacapan, 1978; Mendl, 1999; Muraven & Baumeister, 
2000; Oaten & Cheng, 2005), and directing attention (Carver & Scheier 1981; Mann & 
Ward, 2007; Posner & Rothbart, 1998) all take their toll on the resources needed for self-
regulation.  
Mental fatigue can lead to a depleted state; Van der Linden and colleagues (2002) 
confirmed the effects of mental fatigue on planning. The authors used the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Test and the Tower of London task, which measure cognitive flexibility and 
planning, respectively. The results demonstrated that participants who were fatigued 
showed more conservative behavior on the Wisconsin Card Sorting task and had a longer 
planning time on the Tower of London task. The results imply that mental fatigue 
compromised the executive function mechanism responsible for planning and cognitive 
flexibility. Researchers have also found that when self-regulation is utilized, blood 





participants experienced in the experiment had considerable effects on not only their 
ability to self-regulate but also on their ability to plan for future events, because self-
regulation requires planning and cognitive flexibility in order to mediate behavior 
effectively. 
Self-regulation, a process similar to cognitive control, is a higher order process 
that both biases and is alerted by the lower level error-monitoring network. The error-
monitoring network is involved in both multitasking and self-regulation, and plays a 
crucial role in self-regulatory behaviors and controlled cognition (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 
2000). Error recognition and performance monitoring are the foundation for successful 
self-regulation. Without noticing that an error was committed, a compensatory behavior 
cannot be executed. 
The error-related negativity (ERN) and the positivity following an error (Pe) are 
the neurophysiological markers of error monitoring and error recognition, respectively. 
The ERN is a preconscious process which occurs before awareness of an error is 
established and peaks around 50 ms after an error response. Whereas the ERN indicates 
error detection and conflict monitoring, the Pe denotes error recognition and occurs 
anywhere from 200 to 500 ms after an error response (Falkenstein, M., Hoormann, 
Christ, & Hohnsbein, 2000). The ERN is a response-locked event-related potential (ERP) 
component associated with an erroneous response (Gehring, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 
1990; Gehring & Fencsik, 2001; Rabbitt, 1966). Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, and 
Donchin (1993) manipulated speed and accuracy stress during a flanker task and found 
that accuracy stress produced larger amplitude ERNs, while speed stress muted the 





due to the saliency of the error. When participants emphasized accuracy, erroneous 
responses were more salient and were more important to avoid. In this case, data suggest 
the task goal of being more accurate augmented the amplitude of the ERN. When the task 
emphasized speed, the avoidance of errors in order to complete the goal was no longer 
important and the errors produced a smaller ERN waveform. Additionally, Scheffers and 
Coles (2000) demonstrated that smaller ERNs were produced when the subjects did not 
recognize the error, while errors that were directly and overtly perceived produced the 
expected large ERN signatures.  
Not all errors are equal; many are context driven. If there is not enough 
information to make a judgment, the error will not be perceived as an error. Yeung, 
Botvinick, and Cohen (2004) suggest that the ERN is an electrophysiological 
manifestation of conflict that occurs following an error as a result of continuous stimulus 
processing. According to the authors, the continuous posterror processing of the stimulus 
activates the correct response choice, while the conflict with the incorrect behavioral 
response produces the ERN. Researchers have used neuroimaging methodologies to 
identify the error detection network’s neural substrates, the evidence of which suggests 
that the ERN originates within the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) at around 50 ms 
posterror response (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Falkenstein et al., 
2000; Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003; Herrmann et al., 2004; Kerns et al., 2004). A 
stimulus-response conflict is detected by the ACC when there is a mismatch of goal 
objectives and response.  
The importance of the ACC’s processes in human cognition, especially as related 





to Bush, Luu, and Posner (2000), the anterior cingulate is responsible for processing 
sensory, motor, cognitive, and emotional information, integrating input from various 
sources (including motivation, evaluation of error, and representations from cognitive and 
emotional networks), and modulating cognitive, motor, endocrine, and somatic responses. 
Models of the neural substrates involved in human cognitive processes rarely 
overlook the ACC. In fact, the function of the ACC is one of the most important topics of 
research in modern cognitive neuroscience (Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, & Carter, 1999; 
Carter, Botvinick, & Cohen, 1999; Critchley, 2005; Peterson et al., 1999). Peterson and 
colleagues (1999) provided fMRI evidence linking performance on the Stroop task to 
ACC activation. The authors concluded that the ACC mediates both working memory 
and response selection. Converging evidence from MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, and 
Carter (2000) suggests the ACC’s involvement in cognitive control, a process that also 
heavily involves working memory. Largely, the ACC is responsible for monitoring 
stimuli in the environment that conflict with previously established expectations 
(Botvinik, Cohen, & Carter, 2000). When information in the external environment 
mismatches the internal cue, the ACC directs higher-order brain regions to pay more 
attention to the task.  
Miller, Watson, and Strayer (2012) established that different WMC groups have 
notably differing electrophysiological responses to error trials, namely differences within 
the ACC, marked by the amplitude of ERN signatures. The authors conducted a study 
comparing individuals in upper and lower quartiles of the OSPAN (Unsworth, Heitz, 
Schrock, & Engle, 2005) distribution of performance on a spatial variant of the Simon 





that high WMC individuals had a more robust error detection network, marked by greater 
ERN amplitude. Because working memory influences the error-monitoring network, 
holding task goals in working memory must be vital for error detection, self-regulation, 
and cognitive control. 
The Pe, or positivity following an error, originates within the posterior cingulate 
cortex (PCC; Falkenstein et al., 2000; Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis, & Ridderinkhof, 2005). 
Located behind the ACC in the limbic system, the PCC plays a central role in the default 
mode network (Fransson & Marrelec, 2008). The default mode network1 has been shown 
to be responsible for episodic memory, autobiographical information, theory of mind, and 
social evaluations (Andrews-Hanna, 2012). According to the literature, the PCC is the 
culprit that drains cognitive resources in order to perform conscious thinking about the 
self and utilizes self-restraint in the form of self-regulation.  
The Pe is an ERP component believed to be a manifestation of conscious 
awareness of an error. Overbeek et al. (2005) suggest three theories as to the function of 
the Pe: the affective-processing hypothesis, the behavior-adaptation hypothesis, and the 
error-awareness hypothesis. The affective-processing hypothesis suggests that the 
function of the Pe is to provide an emotional influence in making an erroneous response, 
or in other words, participants become emotionally upset by errors, allowing for a highly-
salient case of behavioral correction. Furthermore, the affective-processing hypothesis 
suggest that the brain is using affect as a form of data to drive the salience of an error. 
Therefore, according to this hypothesis, the Pe is the brain’s electrophysiological 
                                               
1 For more information on the default mode network, see Raichle, MacLeod, Snyder, 
Powers, Gusnard, & Schulman, 2001; Greicius, Krasnow, Reiss, & Menon, 2003; 





manifestation of an emotional response to an error. 
The behavior-adaptation hypothesis explains that the Pe provides a cue to the 
higher-order regions of the brain to modify the current behavior in order to stay on task. 
The ACC relays the error information to the PCC, which then biases the processing of the 
prefrontal cortex in order to stay on task. Deviations from the goal (i.e., errors) will create 
a larger Pe signal and result in a controlled reappropriation of attention back toward the 
task goal. This hypothesis is of particular interest because it supports the notion that 
cognitive self-regulation can be directly measured by the amplitude of the Pe. By 
measuring the degree to which the goal has deviated and measuring posterror slowing on 
the subsequent trial, researchers can quantify the amount of cognitive control and self-
regulation exerted in order to reassert a goal-oriented state. The PCC unites the two 
seemingly disparate terms (cognitive control and self-regulation) in a quantifiable way. 
The error-awareness hypothesis is much simpler than the previous two 
hypotheses. The error-awareness hypothesis suggests that the Pe reflects the participants’ 
subjective awareness of the error they have committed. The Pe is responsible for one or 
all three of these hypotheses but is more likely that a combination of all three contribute 
to the generation of the Pe waveform. Together, the ACC and the PCC create an error-
monitoring network associated with detecting and correcting goal-inconsistent behavior, 
which acts to update behavioral goals under the supervision of the prefrontal cortex 
(Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). 
Often, social and cognitive psychologists refer to comparable control mechanisms 
in their research, such as self-regulation and cognitive control, respectively. For instance, 





regulatory processes can be measured and predicted. This manuscript provides evidence 
for the resources used by cognitive control mechanisms under manipulations commonly 
used in self-regulation research, thereby bolstering the body of literature on cognitive 
control and the metabolic resources used in higher-order cognitive processes. 
Fatigue and glucose manipulations typically are used in self-regulation literature, 
whereas error-related ERPs are used as dependent variables from the cognitive control 
literature. The present research brings these two ideas together to show that the 
manipulations have an effect in terms of self-regulatory behavior which manifests in the 
cognitive control and ERP components associated with cognitive control. Our goal is to 
determine if these two bodies of literature align. In order to address this research 
question, we induced cognitive fatigue, then gave participants either glucose or placebo 
drinks. We focused on the ERN and the Pe, ERP components specifically dealing with 
detecting and correcting errant behavior as part of the cognitive control network. Our 
prediction is that if there is a linkage between the two bodies of literature, then the self-
regulatory manipulations (i.e., fatigue and glucose) should modulate the ERP components 
associated with cognitive control. Specifically, both the ERN and Pe will be modulated 
due to cognitive fatigue and glucose manipulations. We predict that both waveforms will 
decrease in amplitude due to cognitive fatigue, and that both will increase in amplitude 
when participants are given glucose. Finally, we predict that behavioral performance will 
diminish as cognitive fatigue sets in, but participants who receive glucose will have 










Thirty-three participants from the University of Utah were recruited to take part in 
this study. Two participants were excluded from analysis because they did not make 
enough errors to analyze error-related ERPs, and one participant dropped out of the study 
after the first session. The remaining 30 participants (16 female, x̄=23.4 years old) were 
included in all subsequent analyses. Using a within-subjects design, participants were 
instructed to schedule two appointments anywhere from 2 days to 2 weeks apart. 
Participants who were left-handed, diagnosed with hypoglycemia, hyperglycemia, Type 1 
or Type 2 diabetes, any neurological disorders or recent head trauma, or above the age of 
45 were excluded from participation in the study. All participants provided informed 
consent and received course credit upon completion of the experiment. IRB approval for 
this experiment was granted by the University of Utah. 
 
Materials and Procedures 
Session One: In the first session, participants had an electrode cap placed on their 
scalps and electrodes applied to their faces in order to record electroencephalographic 
(EEG) and electrooculargraphic (EOG) signals. After situating participants with the 
electrodes, we tested participants’ baseline blood glucose levels. Participants were 





hours before their appointments. A questionnaire verified that participants did not eat for 
at least 4 hours before the study, and that they had a normal amount sleep the previous 
night. Having participants fast ensured that the participants were at their individual 
baseline blood glucose levels (Donohoe & Benton, 2000). We expected there to be 
fluctuations among individual baseline blood glucose levels, and the initial blood glucose 
measurement was used to statistically control for this variance. Blood glucose levels were 
measured by piercing the skin on the participant’s finger using a SafeLan Pro lancing 
device. Approximately 0.4 µL of blood was collected using OneTouch Verio IQ test 
strips and analyzed using the OneTouch Verio IQ blood glucose analyzer.  
After having collected the first blood sample for glucose measurements, 
participants were tested individually on a high-congruency version of the Eriksen and 
Eriksen (1974) flanker task created in E-prime 2.0. We instructed participants to respond 
based on the identity of the centrally presented letter in a series of five letter horizontal 
arrays. There were two types of stimuli: Congruent and incongruent. A congruent 
stimulus consisted of all identical letters (e.g., SSSSS or HHHHH) and an incongruent 
stimulus consisted of “flanking” letters that were associated with the opposite response 
(e.g., SSHSS or HHSHH). Each stimulus was preceded by a fixation cross, presented for 
200 ms in the center of the display followed by a blank screen for 100 ms. Stimuli 
remained in view until the participant responded or 2000 ms had elapsed. The 5-letter 
horizontal array subtended 2.60 degrees of visual angle.  
Participants first completed a practice block of 50 trials to familiarize themselves 
with the task. Average response time and accuracy statistics were presented to the 





practice task with accuracy lower than 75%, additional instructions were provided, and 
the participants attempted the practice again. Participants were instructed to respond to 
the target letter as quickly and as accurately as possible with the “Z” and “/” keys on a 
keyboard with their left and right index fingers, respectively. The mapping of response 
keys to the central letter identity was counterbalanced across participants. Once the 
practice block was completed and the participants felt comfortable with the task, 
participants performed one block of 800 trials of the flanker task. 
After the first block of the flanker task, participants completed an automated 
version of the OSPAN task (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005) to reinforce the 
fatigue manipulation of the experiment. During the OSPAN task, participants were 
presented with simple math problems and the participant reported the veracity of the 
statement as either “true” or “false” (e.g., (8/2)+2=12…“False”). Following each math 
problem, a letter was presented for later recall. After sets of 3 to 7 math/letter pairs, the 
participants were prompted to recall the letters in the order in which they were presented. 
All OSPAN stimuli were presented on a computer screen and responses were made with 
a computer mouse.2  
After participants completed the OSPAN task, another blood sample was taken to 
measure blood glucose levels. The purpose of this measurement was to determine how 
much glucose participants metabolized during the fatigue portion of the study. After 
blood glucose levels were recorded, participants consumed either 12 fluid ounces of 
lemon-lime Gatorade containing 21 grams of sugar (glucose), or 12 fluid ounces of a 
placebo version of lemon-lime Gatorade that did not contain glucose. Gatorade 
                                               






manufactures this placebo for the purposes of blood-glucose experiments in their research 
and development department (Baker, Rollo, Stein, & Jeukendrup, 2015). The beverages 
were kept chilled and were drunk through a straw to minimize the taste profile, which 
reduced the chance that the participant could guess which beverage they were drinking. 
Random assignment to either the glucose condition or the placebo condition during the 
first session was determined by a coin flip, and the drinks were administered using a 
double-blind procedure. Fourteen participants drank the Gatorade with glucose during 
their first session, and 16 participants drank the placebo Gatorade during their first 
session. 
While the glucose was being metabolized, participants completed another block 
of the flanker task. Prior studies have indicated that it takes around 15 minutes for liquid 
glucose to be metabolized and become available for cerebral functions when at baseline 
blood-glucose levels (Reivich et al., 1985). This block of the flanker task allowed for the 
glucose to be fully metabolized and to be available to use as a metabolic resource. 
Following the second block of the flanker task, participants had their blood glucose levels 
tested again. Once blood glucose levels were tested, participants completed the third and 
final block of the flanker task, followed by a final blood glucose level test. 
Session Two: In session two, the same 30 participants completed the experiment 2 
days to 2 weeks after the first session using the same experimental protocol outlined in 
session one. However, during the second session, the glucose conditions were switched. 
For example, if a participant was randomly assigned to drink the placebo Gatorade during 
the first session, they then consumed the Gatorade containing glucose during the second 





participants were debriefed and received research credit for participating. 
 
Design 
Table 1 provides an overview of the protocol and design of the experiment. The 
study utilized a 2 (glucose vs. placebo condition) by 3 (flanker blocks) double blind 
placebo controlled within-subjects design. All participants completed three blocks of the 
flanker task per session, totaling six blocks per participant over the course of the two 
sessions. Each block consisted of 800 randomized trials, resulting in 2400 trials per 
participant per session. The congruent stimuli (e.g., HHHHH) comprised 75% of the 
trials, while the incongruent stimuli (e.g., SSHSS) comprised 25% of the trials, thereby 
creating a high-congruency variant of the paradigm. After every block of 800 trials, the 
program presented the participants with feedback on their average accuracy and response 
time for that block.  
 
ERP Recording 
For both sessions, participants had electrodes applied to their scalps and faces to 
record electroencephalographic (EEG) and electrooculargraphic (EOG) signals. For 
EEG/ERP data collection, we utilized a 36-channel SynAmps cap manufactured by 
Compumedics Neuroscan and placed the cap according to the International 10-20 
placement guidelines (Jasper, 1958). We used a Compumedics Neuroscan NuAmps 
amplifier to digitize the signal for computer-based recording and processing. The 
amplifier sampled EOG and EEG signals at a rate of 250 Hz with a notch filter at 60 Hz 





exfoliating gel on the sites where they applied 10-mm diameter Ag/AgCl biopotential 
electrodes external eye and mastoid electrodes. Mastoid and facial electrodes were 
applied using adhesive electrode collars and filled with saline-based gel. Electrodes in the 
cap were filled with sponges, and a saline solution was inserted into the electrodes until 
the sponge expanded and contacted the participant’s scalp. Saline was applied until 
impedances on all electrodes was below 10 kOhms. HEOG and VEOG artifacts were 
corrected offline using Neuroscan’s Scan 4.5 software. Trials with artifacts in the EEG 
signals were not included in the subsequent analysis (this excluded less than 4% of the 
data). Additionally, we employed an a-priori exclusion criterion for each participant 
having five or fewer accepted error trials per flanker block which, as mentioned above, 
resulted in the exclusion of two participants from the analysis. Error response events were 
epoched from -500 ms before the event to 1000 ms post event. A band pass zero phase 
shift filter from 0.1 Hz to 30 Hz was applied before rejecting artifacts that exceeded 
above 70 and below -70 microvolts. We created a final waveform by averaging the 













Table 1 Experimental protocol overview 















































Blood Glucose Levels 
           Figure 1 shows the blood glucose levels throughout the experiment. When 
participants consume glucose, a spike in blood glucose is evident for the third blood 
draw. Blood glucose levels were analyzed using a 2 (condition) by 4 (time course) 
repeated measures ANOVA. The analysis revealed a main effect of time on blood 
glucose levels F(3,87)= 56.69 p <0.01, η2=0.66. As expected, when participants drink 
glucose, their blood levels increased, and when they drank the placebo, their blood 
glucose was unchanged. The analysis also revealed a main effect of block on blood 
glucose levels F(3,87)= 39.13  p <0.01, η2=0.57, and a significant interaction of condition 
by block on blood glucose F(3,87)= 85.31 p <0.01, η2=0.75. 
 
Behavioral Data 
Perusal of Figures 2 and 3 indicate that both conditions had similar behavioral 
outcomes on the flanker task. Cumulative accuracy functions (CAFs) were calculated as a 
way of visualizing the behavioral data by plotting accuracy as a function of RT. CAFs 
were created for the glucose condition (see Figure 3) and the placebo condition (see 
Figure 2) for each of the three blocks of the flanker task by creating Vincentized deciles 
for participants in each of the experimental conditions. The CAFs reflect the average 





(glucose vs. placebo), flanker block, and trial type (congruent vs. incongruent). Figure 4 
shows the behavioral equivalency of the glucose and placebo groups during the third 
block of the flanker task. 
The RT and accuracy data from the flanker task were analyzed using a 2 (glucose 
condition) by 3 (flanker block) by 2 (congruent vs. incongruent trial type) repeated 
measures ANOVA. Response time (RT) and accuracy for congruent and incongruent trial 
types are displayed in Figures 5 and 6, respectively. We considered trials outside the 
range of 200 to 2000 ms as outlier trials, and they were excluded from analysis. 
Additionally, trials where participants responded three standard deviations above or 
below their mean RT for that condition were also excluded from further analysis (less 
than 2% of trials). There was no main effect of condition on RT F(1,28)= 0.002, p <0.97, 
η2=0.00, nor was there a main effect of block on RT F(2,28)= 2.83, p <0.08, η2=0.09. 
This indicates that RT was not modulated by cognitive fatigue, nor was the glucose 
administration directly related to RT. However, there was a main effect of trial type on 
RT. Participants had significantly slower responses for incongruent trials than for 
congruent trials F(1,28)= 174.25, p <0.00, η2=0.68. No other effects or interactions were 
significant for RT.  
As shown in Figure 6, there was a main effect of block on flanker accuracy 
F(2,28)= 7.71,  p <0.05, η2=0.35. As the experiment progressed and fatigue set in, 
participants became less accurate. Participants were also less accurate on incongruent 
trials F(2,28)=61.63, p <0.00, η2=0.67. There was no main effect of the glucose 







In Figure 7, posterror slowing was calculated on a participant-by-participant basis 
by subtracting the average response time of correct trials following a correct response 
from the average response time of correct trials following an error response. We analyzed 
posterror slowing using a 2 (condition) by 3 (block) repeated measures ANOVA. The 
analysis revealed a main effect of block F(2,58)= 5.73, p <0.05, η2=0.17, but not of 
condition on posterror slowing F(2,58)= 0.14,  p=0.71, η2=0.01. These results indicate 
that posterror slowing is sensitive to fatigue manipulations, but not to glucose 
manipulations. 
 
Error-Related Event Potentials 
            Figure 8 presents the average response-locked ERPs recorded at electrode site Cz 
for trials during the first block of the flanker task. ERPs for the second block are 
displayed in Figure 9, and ERPs for the third block are displayed in Figure 10. In each 
figure, the glucose and placebo conditions for error trials (top panel), correct trials 
(middle panel), and the difference waveforms (bottom panel) are plotted. For trials with 
an error, there is an initial negative component in the ERP that peaks at 75 ms (the ERN), 
followed by a positive component that peaks at 325 ms (the Pe).  
 
Error-Related Negativity 
The area under the curve measurements for the ERN is presented in Figure 11. To 
analyze the ERN, response-locked averages were generated for each condition, block, 





between -500 ms and 0 ms from the waveforms. Difference waveforms were calculated 
from the average correct signals subtracted from the average error ERPs, and the 
difference between these two waveforms was analyzed. We quantified the ERN by 
integrating the area between 0 and 150 ms (see Coleman, Watson, & Strayer, 2018). 
Inferential statistics were generated using a 2 (condition) by 3 (block) repeated measures 
ANOVA. There was a significant interaction of condition by block F(2,58)= 4.14, p 
<0.05, η2=0.11. Participants who consumed glucose had an increased ERN amplitude in 
the third block as compared to those who received the placebo. No other effects were 
significant. 
 
Positivity Following an Error 
 
Figure 12 presents the peak-to-peak measurement for both placebo and glucose 
conditions.  To analyze the Pe, response-locked averages were generated for each 
condition, block, and participant. Averages were corrected by subtracting the average 
value at the peak of the ERN from the waveforms.3 Difference waveforms were 
calculated from the average correct signals subtracted from the average error ERPs, and 
the difference between these two waveforms was analyzed. A 2 (condition) by 3 (block) 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of block on Pe amplitude F(2,28)= 
6.87, p <0.05, η2=0.19, but no main effect of condition nor a significant interaction. 
These results indicate that there was no effect of glucose on the Pe, and that the Pe is  
 
                                               
3 The Pe waveforms was also analyzed by integrating the area between 150 and 700 ms (relative to a 150 
ms baseline). A 2 (condition) by 3 (block) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of 
block, F(2,28)= 3.83, p =0.04, η2=0.21; however, neither the main effect of condition, nor the interaction 






susceptible to cognitive fatigue. The total number of errors per participant per block are 






Table 2 Overall statistics 
 
 
    df       F ratio Significance 
RT Block 2,28 2.83 ns 
 
Condition 1,28 0.01 ns 
 
Block x Condition 2,58 0.83 ns 
     
ACC Block 2,28 7.71 * 
 
Condition 1,28 4.13 * 
 
Block x Condition 2,58 0.14 ns 
     
PES Block 2,28 5.73 ** 
 
Condition 1,28 0.14 ns 
 
Block x Condition 2,58 1.85 ns 
     
ERN Block 2,28 2.87 ns 
 
Condition 1,28 1.47 ns 
 
Block x Condition 2,58 4.14 * 
     
Pe Block 2,28 6.87 ** 
 
Condition 1,28 1.16 ns 
 
Block x Condition 2,58 0.94 ns 
 
Table 2 provides the statistics for response time (RT), accuracy (ACC), posterror slowing 
(PES), error related negativity (ERN), and positivity following an error (Pe) 
measurements. Significance levels marked with a single star (*) are statistically 
significant at the p<0.05 level, p values marked with two stars (**) are statistically 








Figure 1. Average blood glucose levels in mg/dl for both glucose and placebo conditions 
across the four blood draw time points. Error bars represent the standard error of the 























































































200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100
F Congruent Block 1
F Incongruent Block 1
F Congruent Block 2
F Incongruent Block 2
F Congruent Block 3










































200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100
F Congruent Block 1
F Incongruent Block 1
F Congruent Block 2
F Incongruent Block 2
F Congruent Block 3













































200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100
F Glucose Congruent Block 3
F Glucose Incongruent Block 3
F Placebo Congruent Block 3








Figure 5. Mean response times in milliseconds for both glucose and placebo conditions 
for the three flanker blocks. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
 



















































Figure 6. Mean accuracy for both glucose and placebo conditions for the three flanker 
blocks. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
 


















































Figure 7. Posterror slowing in milliseconds for both glucose and placebo conditions for 






































Figure 8. Block 1 ERPs consist of error trials, correct trials, and error-correct trials, 
respectively, for the first block of the flanker task. Waveforms are response-locked 
















































































































































































Figure 9. Block 2 ERPs consist of error trials, correct trials, and error-correct trials, 
respectively, for the second block of the flanker task. Waveforms are response-locked 

















































































































































































Figure 10. Block 3 ERPs consist of error trials, correct trials, and error-correct trials, 
respectively, for the third block of the flanker task. Waveforms are response-locked 














































































































































































Figure 11. ERN area under the curve averages for both glucose and placebo conditions 










































Figure 12. Peak to peak measurement averages for both glucose and placebo conditions 


















































Table 3. Errors per participant per block 
 











01 53 49 65 56 59 45 
02 103 103 103 84 106 103 
03 13 16 22 16 15 21 
04 35 39 63 92 26 26 
05 26 32 36 33 28 110 
06 10 15 25 9 11 24 
07 40 29 39 37 28 61 
08 19 33 57 11 8 18 
09 9 10 13 21 12 18 
10 6 37 29 24 30 36 
11 26 24 42 25 35 45 
12 5 8 14 11 12 13 
13 23 18 35 19 17 26 
14 57 43 76 101 104 97 
15 59 69 63 40 46 56 
16 12 21 28 20 25 29 
17 12 12 13 12 26 19 
18 31 38 37 43 46 45 
19 44 31 59 63 49 107 
20 18 24 50 45 45 43 
21 52 34 33 31 37 35 
22 25 43 40 21 28 31 
23 28 28 54 66 31 68 
24 37 35 42 14 46 38 
25 8 6 5 11 9 12 
26 48 55 58 43 42 43 
27 6 10 7 14 27 25 
28 25 50 7 24 41 41 
29 26 51 50 32 34 30 











The purpose of this research was to explore the relationship between self-
regulation and cognitive control. In the self-regulation literature, manipulations of 
glucose and fatigue are often used to measure changes in overt behavior (Baumeister et 
al., 1998; Scholey, Harper, & Kennedy, 2001). In the cognitive control literature, ERPs 
recorded in conflict paradigms are often used to determine the mechanisms involved in 
cognitive control (e.g., Coleman, Watson, & Strayer, 2018). The current research merged 
the two literatures by examining error-related ERPs elicited in a conflict paradigm while 
using the glucose and fatigue manipulations to explore the overlap between the two 
approaches.  Utilizing a double-blind placebo controlled experimental design, we 
determined the impact of fatigue and glucose on ERP components associated with 
cognitive control affording inferences on the underlying neural substrates.   
Figure 13 provides a representation of the observed effects of this experiment. 
There were significant effects of glucose and fatigue on the ERN.  By contrast, fatigue 
modulated the Pe, but glucose did not.   The dissociative effect of glucose on the ERN 
and the Pe helps to link the cognitive control and self-regulation literatures.  Given what 
is known about the neurophysiology associated with error detection, the ERN, and the Pe 
(Falkenstein et al., 2000; Gehring, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1990; Overbeek, 
Nieuwenhuis, & Ridderinkhof, 2005; Rabbitt, 1966), the current data suggest that the 





advantage of this resource (at least within the timing of the current study). 
Based upon the overlap in the self-regulation and cognitive control literatures, we 
hypothesized that the effects of glucose and fatigue would be observed in both the ERN 
and Pe. It would appear that the link between the literatures is through the ERN, an error-
related ERP component thought to be generated in the ACC.  The ERN is thought to be a 
preconscious waveform initiated by a mismatch in stimulus expectation and behavioral 
response (Gehring, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1990; Rabbitt, 1966). This waveform is 
associated with error detection after an erroneous response is committed. The interaction 
of fatigue and glucose on the ERN suggests that the behavioral outcomes observed in 
self-regulation literature are due in part to the metabolic changes in the ACC. 
The Pe, an error-related ERP component thought to be generated in the PCC, was 
not sensitive to manipulations of blood glucose. As such, the link between this 
component and the literature on self-regulation and cognitive control is more tenuous. 
The Pe is thought to signal either a change in behavior, an affective response, or the 
initial processing of error saliency (Overbeek et al., 2005). However, we did not find any 
evidence that supports any of these interpretations. The Pe in this experiment was 
sensitive to the fatigue manipulation, suggesting that the Pe is not a direct measure for 
self-regulatory processing. 
Our findings are consentient with the notion that the ERN is a preconscious signal 
in that we found no behavioral changes in terms of response time, accuracy, or posterror 
slowing between placebo and glucose groups. We did, however, see an increase in the 
ERN. Interestingly, what this may suggest is that self-regulation processes are also 





experiments; there is often an overt change in behavior due to a subtle glucose or fatigue 
manipulation. Participants are often unaware of the behavioral changes in these 
experiments. For example, when participants ate the cookies in the Baumeister et al. 
experiment (1998) they were not aware that they were spending more time on the 
difficult problems than the group that ate radishes. These overt behavioral changes were 
due to preconscious mechanism being manipulated by glucose, much like we saw in this 
experiment. 
With respect to the initial research question, the ERN provides a link between the 
cognitive control and self-regulation literatures. Manipulations commonly used in the 
self-regulation literature modulate the ERN, a component associated with error regulation 
in the cognitive control literature. This implicates the ACC as the common neural link. 
The link between the literatures is more tenuous with the Pe, given the lack of changes in 
posterror slowing associated with the glucose manipulation. PET and fMRI studies on 
cerebral blood flow provide evidence that blood flow to the PCC is increased when the 
default mode is active (Raichle et al., 2001). During visual attention tasks, however, the 
blood flow to the ACC increases (Paus, Koski, Caramanos, & Westbury, 1998; Shulman 
et al., 1997). When attentional control networks are active, there appears to be decreased 
blood flow to the PCC. This literature helps to explain the effect of glucose on the ERN 
but not the Pe. By engaging the ACC in the flanker task, participants may have increased 
blood flow and higher levels of cerebral metabolism in this brain region. Conversely, 
because blood flow to the PCC was reduced, the glucose manipulation was ineffective. 
One future direction could be to use a more difficult task using the same 





task we used in this experiment produced reliable ERPs, but as a ceiling effect was 
evident. Another future experiment could use a protocol that had a more dynamic time 
interval for blood glucose testing. A final future direction could look at other mechanisms 
thought to have restorative effects. For example, prior studies have shown that creative 
thinking, working memory, and problem-solving skills all improve after spending time in 
a natural environment without technology for an extended period of time (Atchley, 
Strayer, & Atchley, 2012; Berman, Jonides, & Kaplan, 2008; Kaplan, 1995). The 
mechanism for the restorative effect of nature is thought to be the activating of the default 
mode network. When the default mode network is active, it gives the prefrontal cortex 
time to rest which decreases cerebral metabolism and increases the availability of glucose 
and glycogen. Based on the results of this study, glucose has a restorative effect on the 
ERN. It would be theoretically informative to see if the same results are obtained from a 
natural environment as with a restorative chemical (i.e., glucose). 
In conclusion, this experiment demonstrated that cognitive control mechanisms 
are indeed influenced by the depletion and resource manipulations commonly used in the 
self-regulation literature. This is the first study that utilizes the fatigue and glucose 
manipulations to dissociate the functions of the ERN and Pe, and links the cognitive 
control and self-regulation literatures. The neurophysiological measures utilized in this 
experiment can be used to explain the loading factors and states that determine one’s 
ability to self-regulate and engage in cognitive control processes. The current research 
dissociated the the ERN and the Pe and suggests that the ACC utilizes glucose for 






to control and correct errant behavior. The results from this experiment indicate that there 
is a link between the self-regulation and cognitive control literatures.  
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